Costs of Political Intermediation and Sustainability of the European Social Model in Health Care: the Dutch Example
A previous version of this article was published in the October 2010, no. 15, issue of the “European Papers on the New Welfare”. Both are an expansion and updating of the contribution carried out by Giulio Ercolessi in the international conference “Per una politica sanitaria europea / Health Care Policy and Fundamental Rights in Europe” organised by the European Liberal Forum with the support of the Critica liberale foundation in Rome, Villa Spalletti Trivelli, 27th November 2008.
Una versione ridotta in italiano degli argomenti contenuti in questo articolo nella sintesi della lezione tenuta il 15 maggio 2017 nell’ambito della Scuola di Liberalismo di Messina organizzata dalla Fondazione Luigi Einaudi.
1) The European social model can be
safeguarded only by agreeing to reshape it
Europe will not emerge from the Great Crisis to
take up where it left off.
Like it or not, and even if politicians, especially in Italy with few
exceptions, do their best to reassure and treat their voters as small
children
from whom it is always advisable to hide the ugly truth (and voters do
little
to have somebody tell them), it would certainly not be possible to
revive the
old industrial society, its certainties, its rhythms, its stable and
standardised prospects. Even the European social model, the economic,
cultural
and institutional accomplishment of twentieth-century social covenants
and the
identity flag of the European Union in the world, cannot be preserved
in its
essentials if we don’t undertake timely and far reaching
reforms capable of
ensuring its sustainability and equity over time.
This state of affairs belongs to the order of
facts rather than opinions.
Both advocates of a return to the stabilising and redistributive role
of public
spending after the sprees of the last two or three decades and
defenders of the
widest possible market self-regulation will have to consider the
consequences
of structural changes that took place in the social organisation, in
the
structure of labour relations, in international competition, and the
consequences of technological, cultural and above all demographic
changes that
today separate us from the sort of Europe that existed in the second
half of
the twentieth century. It is not simply a dispute pitting those willing
to
maintain and develop a strong framework of social protection against
the most
merciless partisans of social Darwinism. Even those who believe that
the
European social model deserves to be preserved in its objectives and
its
essentials and those who believe liberal democracy should ensure the
highest
degree of equality of opportunities or social solidarity need to
understand
certain facts. They must understand that the widest possible
preservation of
the structures of the twentieth-century welfare state in the form and
with their
historically consolidating tools are no longer appropriate means to the
end,
and even risk becoming a source of unjust unintended consequences,
especially
but not only in intergenerational relations.
Indeed, insisting on the defence or
reconfirmation of the old system
of safeguards and of its well established rules may even cause an
irreversible
financial crisis for every social safety net, so as to make its
dissolution
inevitable in the medium term. That is, when all the present decision
makers,
politicians, industrialists, union leaders, have left the scene having
got off
scot-free, because only a few historians will seek to re-establish
their
responsibility, for the sole interest of a specialised audience.
The substantial dissolution of the
universalistic European welfare system
could then also be remembered as a crucial step in the real
“downfall of the
West” that seems to be unfolding today in a very different
and opposite way to
that originally stated by its early traditionalist theorists at the
beginning
of the twentieth century. In the direction, that is to say, of a
further and
final decline of liberal and individualistic Western democracy in
favour of
models of more authoritarian and organic global world organisation,
increasingly less concerned with combining economic development with
individual
freedom and human rights, separating the two sides of the modernisation
process
until now considered by most of Western culture as naturally
interconnected.
Responsible leaders, instead could, and should,
discuss the desirable
measure of redistributive intervention in public spending,
compatibility, tax
burden, equality or inequality in relation to need, merit and talent,
and
according to criteria of equity, effectiveness, growth or economic
stabilisation. They should also discuss the quantification of the total
expenditure to be allocated for social protection. In any case,
whatever the
general options in economic policies they should rethink the welfare
structure
from its foundations and its composition in the new actual situation.
Concerning the issue of retirement, in fact,
where the stakes and interests
involved, although subject of bitter controversy, are relatively
understandable
even to quite a large audience, the debate has been going on for years.
The political and even sometimes academic
debate often tends to mix very dissimilar
issues, as if they were different sides of the same ideological or
principle-related argument. It should not be considered off topic,
therefore,
to underline that in a liberal perspective the debate on education
policies,
for example, should have very different contents and objectives. This
is
particularly so given that the socio-economic aspect of the matter is
overlapped
by an ethical-political one. This concerns citizenship education, the
scope of
parental responsibility, whether or not it includes an authoritative
predetermination of the ideal or religious affiliation of children
(also in
light of the New York Convention on the Rights of the Children, and
especially
of those already naturally able to exercise a certain amount of
fundamental freedom).
It also concerns the role of public institutions protecting these
freedoms and
the free development of individual personalities. These assets and
values are
inalienable and should be solely and exclusively related to the
individuals
directly concerned, even if children are not personally and directly
able to
make a choice.
This debate is often completely overlooked in
Italy, sometimes also, though
usually without similar malice, in countries less subject to the daily
challenges of religious fundamentalism and their political
intrusiveness. In
education however the role of public authorities cannot be measured
solely or
mainly as a purely socioeconomic question. Discussing public and
private schools
in fact often means a more concrete discussion of secular or
denominational
teaching, Republic
or faction school, integrated
or communitarian school, free or indoctrination
school (though today
indoctrination is more subtle and sophisticated in denominational
schools, as
it is in the media, far from the coercive practices of the past, that
today are
confined to other parts of the world).
Anyone who believes that the role of guarantor
on the part of the public
authorities in this field is superfluous, parents being the best
interpreters
of their children’s interests, should note how scarce or
nonexistent the
interest in citizenship education, or in civic matters in the broadest
sense,
is likely to be, in the eyes of many Italian parents from those large
sectors
of Italian society (perhaps the majority) whose attitudes were formed
subsequent to when Dino
Risi released “I
mostri” a film that today appears to
be a prophetic description of Italy at
the beginning of this century. Many of those parents certainly want
“what is
best” for their children. In order to achieve this, however,
they are probably
far more inclined to incorporate them into what former presiding
constitutional
court judge Gustavo
Zagrebelsky calls “i
giri
giusti” (the right circles), than help them
develop a critical mind and cultural
personality of their own.
In education in other words, unlike what is
typically the case in the
health care field, the problem does not lie in information
asymmetries
between supplier and purchaser of services, or in the real opportunity
for the
user/consumer/customer/citizen to make informed choices. Above all it
lies in
citizenship education and in ensuring that the directly concerned
individuals have
the greatest freedom to develop the full potential of their individual
personalities in the face of the power, or claim, of others to
predetermine and
condition them (of course, “for the best” of those
concerned, but in the
subjective interpretation of those pro tempore
exercising parental
authority).
In any case, in the field of education
policies, the issue of cost sustainability
arises in a different way, as the essentially demographic factors that
threaten
the welfare system are not an issue, nor are those, both demographic
and
technological, that affect the future of health care. Rather the
contrary is
the case, given the progressive decrease in the school population in
many
Western countries.
2) The unsustainable political
management of the Italian health care
system
In Europe but especially in Italy when it comes
to welfare the most
difficult policies to discuss in a non-stereotyped way are those
relating to
healthcare. This is because the matter is objectively complex, and the
resolution of conflicts concerns not just choosing among different
interests
and values, but first requires a proper setting out of the dilemmas and
secondly the identification, sometimes counterintuitive, of the most
useful
tools for achieving the intended purposes. As already mentioned, it is
inappropriate to reduce such reflections to the guidelines within which
other
social policies are debated. For years this debate has been hostage to
a
primitive political sketch, in which each vested interest and pressure
group
has developed an almost diabolical capability for presenting its own
particular
point of view as the one representing public interest. This applies to
professional politicians, political parties, political consultants,
politically
appointed administrators, bureaucrats, trade-unions, medical and
paramedical
professionals and their sub-groups, entrepreneurial or cooperative
organisations,
players variously qualifiable as non-profit organisations,
religious or
profiteering-religious bodies. This game comes out easily given that in
some
ways the subject is a difficult one. Any non-trivial discussion
concerning it
requires the counterpart to pay serious attention that goes well beyond
the
two/three minutes attention span that the average TV viewer is ready to
apply
before grabbing the remote control to find something more relaxing, or
that comforts
him in confirming his/her acquired platitudes. Most viewers may also
search for
something that reassures them that they already equipped with
sufficient
necessary information to navigate the various political-ideological
ideas on offer.
If this is the state of an average citizen who
has no immediate need of
health care services, health care users – call them patients
or customers –
when at their weakest, with very little information are in the hands of
others
in times of need. They naturally tend to form an opinion only through
the
interpretative filter provided by the individual health care operators,
from
among those with whom they come into contact and with whom they
establish a
higher level of syntony and empathy. Usually they have no clear idea of
the
overall way the system works, and above all of its costs and relative
effectiveness or ineffectiveness, efficiency or inefficiency in
relation to
costs.
Often, however, their immediate interlocutors
have no idea, of costs
and sustainability either. European social systems are
based on the principle
according to which all actual health care needs must be met –
a sacrosanct
principle and one to be defended and implemented to the letter. In some
countries health care is also an absolute right, enshrined in the
constitution.
Fulfilment of this principle, however does fall from the heavens above.
With
the exception of those required to provide financial resources and
those
required to provide health care within the limits of their budget,
every player
in the health care sector tends either to ignore or to widely
underestimate the
problem of costs and long-term, and often not only long-term,
sustainability.
What economists call “moral
hazard” is not only the attitude most people
display, usually with little or no subjective awareness, when they tend
to exploit,
even beyond their real needs and advantages, all services provided free
of
charge, but it is also an attitude widely shared by those who directly
provide
these services. This occurs when, as often happens, they are not aware
of the
costs, nor of the fact that the resources needed are always, by
definition,
limited and always inevitably inadequate to meet needs.
The current stereotyped and dull debate, in
Italy, but not only there,
often seems to suggest that there are basically only two alternatives
up for
discussion. On the one hand there is privatisation of health care,
identified
tout court with the almost total deregulation seen in the American
model, and,
on the other, the all-out defence of the existing system, with the
exception of
a few shareable but marginal ideas for patching it up[1].
And yet there are objective reasons that will
impose, and are in fact
already imposing, changes that, if not properly managed, will very soon
result
in a progressive collapse of the current system. These are the change
in living
and working conditions that have taken place over the last few decades,
the consequent
rise of hard to satisfy expectations, technological progress
– that everyone
expects to be supplied as soon as available –, increased life
expectancy –
partly a consequence of improved technology but also involving a
further
inevitable rise in costs – and the changed demographic
situation. Despite the
decisive and beneficial presence of immigrants this last will
inevitably lead
to an increased number of users and a fall in the number of those
paying for
costs.
It is no wonder that health care is the area of
welfare due for the
greatest increase in spending in the coming decades, both in absolute
terms and
in proportion to GDP. This increase will lead the cost of health care
to greatly
exceed that of pensions. It is certain to be a very large increase,
though how
large is difficult and controversial to assess. Estimates vary between
a
minimum of 2-4 % as a proportion of GDP provided by Ecofin to 2060, and
a
maximum of 9.4 % established by OECD in 2050 taking into account
factors other
than simple demographics. This would lead to more than doubling current
levels.
That is the total expenditure: a stabilisation of the current public
health
care expenditure as a proportion of the Italian GDP at current levels
would
lead at least to a transition from the current coverage of 75 % of
total health
care expenditure to less than 50 %[2]
(that is, less than the contribution of the public expenditure on total
health
costs in the United States before the coming into force of the Obama
reform[3]).
Furthermore, in these conditions investing in
research will become
increasingly difficult also for those European countries that, unlike
Italy,
have not yet totally given up, even though health care is bound to
become one
of the most important sectors in the international economic competition
over
the coming decades.
These reasons already make it increasingly
difficult to keep the promise of
providing effective and timely universal coverage of actual health care
needs,
as established by the European social model, a promise that is now
considered
part of the very constitutional covenant. This is obviously also due to
the
impossibility of increasing spending limitlessly, as that would imply
unsustainably
ever-increasing taxation. Since that is impossible within an
international
context of open markets, the system’s economic sustainability
is increasingly
conditioned by its efficiency and by a clear definition of precisely
what
services it is necessary and fair to ensure to everybody.
The current party-political and monopolistic
management of the Italian health
care system is successful in strengthening the takeover of politics
over
society and in protecting the media image of its political managers.
Structurally,
however, it is much less concerned with, and lacking
greatly in, economic
efficiency or in the ability to effectively guarantee in timely fashion
the services
it is supposed to guarantee. This results in an effort to curb spending
that is
mainly achieved through a creeping cutting down of services, which in
Italy is,
for the most part, not even acknowledged. These cuts do not only
consist in
restricting services to the currently legally guaranteed basic level of
care (“livelli
essenziali di assistenza”). Rather, they are implemented by
effectively making guaranteed services
inaccessible due to long waiting lists, and often through an unstated
attempt
to restrict these services to those less able to demand them. This can
actually
happen because they do not have the financial or cultural means needed
to
understand that they can demand these services, how to do so or what
degree of
individual freedom of choice exists. Such freedom is often guaranteed
by law,
but often its practice is not recommended by those with far greater
competence
than the users, but who do not always share their interests and
priorities.
Almost everywhere in Italy (though with
significant differences among the
various regional and local situations) regional governments and
managers of the
Local Health Authorities (ASL, “azienda
sanitaria locale”) in whose
hands lies the direct political management of the Italian health care
system,
have proved unable to withstand widespread electoral, territorial,
religious,
patronage related and vested interests pressure. In some extreme cases
this
pressure has been even downright criminal or linked to local mafias. As
a
result there has been an inevitable and immeasurable waste of
taxpayers’ money.
Health care expenditure represents about 80 %
of the budget of Italian
regional governments and thus constitutes the core of their power. It
is
precisely the particular complexity of this matter, and hence its
inevitable
opacity in the eyes of the public and the electorate, the difficulty in
understanding policy choices and evaluating their effectiveness,
adequacy and
efficiency that makes particularly abstract (or sinisterly concrete
when viewed
from the perspective of the political class and its interests) the
almost
unanimous, enthusiasm of all the major parties in recent years for the
introduction of “fiscal federalism” on a regional
basis.
It is a pitiful lie, repeated since ordinary
regional governments were
established in the early Seventies in accordance with the
constitutional provision,
but with a delay of more than twenty years, that political power is
much more
accountable to the people if geographically close to them. The
proximity of
politics does not depend on physical distance but on the media. And the
most
powerful and influential media are those structured at the geographic
level
most useful to politics and allowed by the collection of advertising.
In the
Italian case the area of diffusion of the Italian language is still a
better
advertising medium than local dialects (despite the claims of localist
and
separatist movements). Indeed the most influential and decisive among
the
Italian national media – especially television, which is the
main channel of
political information for 80 % of Italian voters – are
nowadays little more
than protrusions of the political system. Although mostly respectful
and loyal
to their political patrons, they are still obliged to provide a minimum
of
information. Thus the national political establishment is still obliged
to put
up with a minimal degree of visibility that, in some marginal niches at
least, is
not always totally idolising and submissive.
This is not generally the case with regional
power. Regional
administrations are the most powerful channel of redistribution of
taxpayers’
money. In fact removed from real and widespread democratic control such
redistribution of resources consequently tends to operate in a manner
contrary
to constitutional provisions, reinforcing, as it does, widespread
political
patronage is the most frequent result, rather than a compliance with
the
virtuous and equitable redistribution criteria established by the 1948
constitution. If many Italians are at least informed about their
political
rulers at a national level, very few of those who have no vested
interests or
are not members of pressure groups even remember the name of any
important
regional politician, apart perhaps from that of the president of their
own
region (or those of corrupt politicians undergoing criminal
investigation). On
the other hand, in a country where their city identity always important
to
people, municipal politics are still capable of arousing some genuine
interest.
That’s why regional elections are
always, much more than municipal ones, a
mere test of the national political balance of power. An increasingly
painful
test of that mystery that Italian politics appears to be, if one sees
it as
does the rest of the Western world instead of through the filter of its
reassuring Italian television representation.
Probably only those involved for professional
and personal reasons and those
belonging to vested interest and pressure groups cast their vote based
on an
informed assessment of health care policies and spending, the core of a
regional
administrations’ power.
It may appear even intolerable in these
circumstances, and in the face of
dramatic territorial imbalances which are not only persistent but also
growing[4],
to limit each individual to the opportunities for health care
determined in
each region as the consequences of electoral choices made in such a
manner by
the majority of their fellow citizens. There is no connection with the
actual
responsibilities of regional politicians. There is just the result of
exchanges
of favours, subdued media and public representations by contenders
often completely
divorced from reality and imposed, usually by national political
parties’ headquarters
with the advertising techniques of commercial marketing. Or at least
that
limitation might seem unfair and inappropriate, if only there were
viable
alternative ways of guaranteeing everybody adequate health care
opportunities.
This is not to deny that, as indeed is obvious,
there are significant
individual and even frequent exceptions, due to the personal and
unusual
dedication of individuals capable of cultivating more demanding
standards of
fairness. Such exceptions are never entirely absent, at any level,
among
politicians and civil servants, not even in situations of increased
decline.
And there is no doubt that these unusually correct behaviours are even
more frequent
among health care workers, as might naturally be expected, in a sector
very
often entered into, at least initially, on the basis of strong
vocational
motivation. It is often the case, however, particularly among those who
actually work from a strong and persistent vocational motivation, that
the
perception of the problem of economic choices in health care as a
complex issue
of public ethics is at the least very vague.
In order to counterbalance the physiological
tendency of politicians to
make irrationally expensive economic choices, in recent years frequent
attempts
were made to artificially re-create mechanisms similar to that of
profit in the
private sector. These were created for managers of Local Health
Authorities or
at times even for general practitioners guaranteeing them performance
bonuses,
based only, or primarily, on curbing expenditure. Not surprisingly,
that
provided further incentive for a non-declared reduction in health care
services, exclusively damaging citizens incapable of defending
themselves.
In some regions, health care costs have
spiralled totally out of control,
bringing regional governments to the brink of bankruptcy. These
situations were
saved by the arrival of inevitable rescue packages from the state,
bound to
reappear in election times, especially after the most severe stage of
the
global crisis is over, and if elections results are uncertain. It will
be
interesting to see how these rescue packages, usually also delivered to
the
advantage of friendly municipal administrations, will be justified in
the near
future by the advocates of “fiscal federalism”. The
general public, however, with
no direct vested interest involvement, will not even become aware of
this. In
the same way almost no Italian, for example, is aware of the repeated
lavish
state rescue packages for the city administration of Catania,
graciously
delivered, at the expense of all the country’s taxpayers, by
the present
allegedly “free market and federalist” national
government to their incumbent
Sicilian friends who had caused the bankruptcy.
Keeping open unreasonably small hospitals and
wards, or those in
irrecoverable condition, very expensive investments started and never
completed
and entire new public hospitals nearly finished but never opened or not
even complying with legal requirements and in the meantime
made unusable
due to neglect and decay, patronising political recruitment of
personnel, the
creation of pointless hospital wards and management offices, the
multiplication
of bureaucracies, favouritism towards political clients and
interference in the
correct economic management of public health services – and
even private ones
operating within the national health service – are present
almost everywhere,
although in very diverse measure in different
geographical areas, and are rather
the rule than the exception.
But often health care political management
turns out to be, as has
increasingly been brought to light by criminal investigations, the
preferred
channel for illegal financing of political parties and politicians.
This is
also the case for the improper and often illegal exchange of favours
among
politicians, entrepreneurial groups able to use politics to obtain
illegal
competitive advantage, religious, political-religious or para-religious
Catholic organisations and the media system. One would need to be
naive, to say
the least, for example, not to see how the segments of the public or
private
health care system that are an organic part of the political cartels
that
manage health care, or are available to act as such, can benefit from a
much
better treatment than that reserved for public and private operators
who only
want to stay focused on providing health care services.
And it is impossible to ignore that this
reality is the inevitable
consequence of the monopolistic party-political management of the
health care
market by a political establishment that, particularly in recent
decades, has
fallen below any possible Western public ethics standard. In truth this
has not
caused too many jolts to Italian public opinion used, as it is to this
situation and stultified as it also is by popular media. The latter
largely
serves the interests of politics and its masters, and public opinion is
led to
a great extent to connive with a political class with which it
increasingly
shares ethical standards that for some time have no longer
been those of
the West.
In these conditions, the basic monopoly for
managing and / or buying health
care services guaranteed to citizens, currently the responsibility of
representatives of the political system in the regions and in
the Local
Health Authorities, is a fundamental element in the web of power
involving
politics, business, bureaucracy, the media, the unions, the Catholic
church and
other vested interest groups that, in reducing its polyarchic
character, make
Italian society the least “open” in Western Europe.
There is indeed a specific, or at least
especially Italian facet in the
debate on health care political management, that, in Italy or in any
country
marked by similar widespread corruption and political mismanagement,
cannot be
seen as secondary or insignificant. There is a reassuring image that is
proposed for internal propaganda by the most influential media, almost
all
interwoven, driven or directly owned by politicians, beginning with
television,
during these years of deep and growing civil barbarisation. Despite
this image,
however, when it comes to public ethics and institutional decay Italy
has been
a country in free fall. In the ranking of corruption drawn up annually
by
Transparency International, it has now been propelled to 63rd place
(worse than
Malaysia and Namibia). It also fell to 49th place (worse than Jamaica
and
Ghana) in the ranking, annually produced by Reporters sans
Frontières, that measures media freedom and independence,
and with it the opportunity
for widespread citizens’ scrutiny of politics
and its use of public resources .
It is at least grossly naive in these
circumstances to even consider
ensuring effectiveness and appropriateness of guaranteed services,
efficiency
and wisdom in expenditure, fairness, transparency and priority of
public
interests. Such a consideration would be impossible while at the same
time leaving
in the hands of regional politicians – a political class even
more unfit than the
central one (apart from, it is always useful to repeat, the usual
individual
exceptions), and widely controlled by only minimally independent and
authoritative media – the direct or indirect power to make
top medical and
managerial appointments, to drive recruitment out of a widespread
system of
patronage, to grant or deny accreditation and agreements to private
health care
providers (which are bound to be permanently dependent on the same
political
system as their almost unique customer and counterpart), to distribute
billion
sum contracts, to handle a total annual
expenditure of around 110 billion Euros and to control its correctness largely by themselves.
These same regional
politicians would have to undertake a myriad of actual and specific
decisions,
largely discretionary, and, due to their technical nature, not liable
to
extensive and widespread democratic public control. In order to monitor
and
evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of such a huge expenditure it
would be
necessary, if possible and economically sensible, to hire legions of
genuinely
politically independent high-profile professional auditors and
inspectors, all
upright and incorruptible, and
with
broad multidisciplinary and multi-specialty expertise in the medical,
pharmaceutical, bioengineering, economic, logistical, legal,
administrative and
sociological field.
Even the strongest supporters of an entirely
public health care system
generally acknowledge – indeed, are often the first to
recognise and denounce[5]
– the weight of corruption, waste, mismanagement, and
connections among
politics, business, the media and religious powers, and in some regions
at
times even criminal ones. Yet they persist in believing that this could
all be
rectified while keeping such decision making and spending power more or
less
directly in the hands of public power[6],
that is (in the end, at least and at best) of politicians. In
today’s Italy
(and in the context of cultural and civic decline devoid of antibodies
in which
two generations of future leaders have already been forming) there is
unfortunately no historical or political sense in expecting a general
or at
least a prevailing honesty and fairness from this political class. Nor
does it
make sense to request that “political parties”, but
not “politics” step aside,
almost as if political parties were the leading players in
misappropriation
because of their supposed inherent monstrous and impersonal wickedness,
rather
than it being the result of the will and activity of those real
individuals, regional
politicians, their increasingly
cross-party de facto connections, their national leaders, their
representatives,
trustees and clients, elected and appointed in the twenty regional
administrations, in the 185 ASL and in the 95 local administrative
bodies that
run public hospitals.
And it is even more grossly naive to trust in
the effectiveness of
democratic control by an inevitably incompetent, careless, uninformed
electorate, one that is systematically duped by a media apparatus
largely
subservient to politicians. Even
when
minor, less influential but truly independent media are involved, they
in turn
are easily misled by the most diverse and unsuspected organisations or
vested
interest groups.
Reform proposals that do not take into account
the prevailing state of
public ethics, widespread corruption or even just the frequent
favouritism
involved in administrative discretion, demonstrate, first and foremost,
no
sense of reality. The same applies to those that do not take into
account the
consequences of the legitimate volatility (often fatuity) of the
choices of
political majorities, which denies those health care market operators
not
organically linked to local political-administrative networks any
serious
planning opportunity – a condition vital for the efficient
operation of the
system. Nor yet are those reform proposals realistic that do not take
into due
account the physiological economic inefficiency, slowness and lack of
responsiveness of the public administrative machine, or do not take
account of
the information asymmetries, inevitably huge in this area, and
the
consequent and structural perceptive distortion they lead to,
preventing
effective public and widespread democratic control. All the proposals,
in
short, that ultimately depend on the will and capacity for self-reform
of the
current Italian political establishment.
The objection suggesting that, since health
care is a primary need, the
sector deserves a set of rules capable of relieving it from subjection
to the
“logic of profit” has in itself only the value of a
rhetorical statement. Food
also is a primary need, but removing the production and distribution of
food
from the “logic of profit”, where it was attempted,
did not result in a better
satisfaction of food needs. And the demand to purely and simply exclude
health
care from the market and from free economic enterprise means entrusting
one of
the key sectors of global competition and economic, scientific and
technological development to one of the worst political classes in
today’s
Europe: with the obvious consequence of being largely marginalised
internationally and forcing further brain drain.
3) The American private-enterprise
model before and after the Obama
reform
On the other hand, the only model for a non
political management of health care
taken into consideration in the current stereotyped public debate has
been the
American one, which is deemed by most Europeans, Italians included not
unreasonably, a remedy worse than the evil. Michael Moore’s
amusing film,
“Sicko”, released in 2006, may have been mistaken
in not even addressing the
problem of the costs of the European health care services (and even in
taking
seriously the presumed efficiency of the Cuban health care system), but
it portrayed
well the failure of the American model, based on
“free” individual bargaining
between single customers and private insurance companies.
The American system is capable of ensuring
America’s success in achieving
excellence and an uncontested primacy in research. It does not however
address
the objective of guaranteeing adequate health care to all the citizens
of the
most powerful nation on this planet. This is a goal that was not even
achieved
with the recently passed health care reform through the initiative of
president
Obama, the first of its kind since the days of Lyndon Johnson, and the
umpteenth
and eventually, in large part, successful attempt to establish a true
health
welfare system, after almost seventy years of previous attempts,
starting with
Truman, an attempt that succeeded after a crushing political defeat was
suffered on the same subject by the previous Democratic administration,
that of
Bill Clinton.
Despite the fact that the president staked all
his weight, his prestige and
his political destiny, although this time the Democrats had the largest
majority in both Houses ever enjoyed by any administration in nearly
forty
years, even after the troubled passage of the Obama reform, between 15
and 22
million individuals (the estimate is surprisingly the subject of bitter
dispute), out of a population of about 305 million, will still not be
able to
afford any health care coverage. In this sense, even after the reform,
the
American system is bound to remain even less economically efficient
than that
of all the countries in Western Europe in terms of the cost-benefit
ratio, at
least as far as the protection of its people’s health is
concerned. In other
words, the efficiency of the American system cannot be assessed in
terms of
results achieved in terms of the protection of the people’s
right to health
care.
According to OECD 2009 data on 2007, Americans
spend 16 % of their GDP on
health care, the highest percentage in the world, much more than all
Western
Europeans. And costs are growing uncontrollably: in absolute terms in
2007,
they tripled compared to 1990 and were eight times higher than in 1980.
By comparison,
in the EU, the highest expenditure is that of France, with 11 % of GDP,
followed by Germany with 10.4. Italy spends 8.7 % of its GDP on health
care;
the Eurozone average is 9.6, which is less than two-thirds of what
Americans
spend. The average in OECD countries is 8.9[7].
Many of the most advanced medical research
centres in the world are
American. But today, before the implementation of the reform, between
45 and 54
million Americans (a number that was growing before the reform, but
this
estimate too is far from precise and unanimous) has no health insurance
coverage whatsoever. Although this includes a small number of wealthy
people
who are not insured because they can cope with any eventuality in case
of need,
and a larger number of younger and healthy people who, while
theoretically able
to afford, with some effort, to pay the cost of insurance, prefer to
run the
risk and give priority to other expenses, most of these people simply
cannot afford
the cost of insurance. At best they take advantage of what is offered
by
charitable organisations in case of need. This will still be the case
for those
bound to remain excluded from any cover even after the implementation
of the
reform.
Thus, according to the latest data available,
which obviously cannot yet
take into account the effects of the reform, that will be fully
operational
only in 2014, the US ranks 41st in terms of life expectancy. The
citizens of
all the major countries of Western Europe (including Italy, ranking
13th) live
longer than the Americans. It may be objected that this result, like
similar
ones that could be mentioned, is not only a consequence of the
organisation of
the health care system. There are many other relevant factors that
could be
mentioned concerning lifestyles, eating habits, social and cultural
inequalities,
average propensity to risk, crime rate, transport security and so on[8].
Many of these factors actually penalise America, whereas, incidentally,
they
mostly enhance the corresponding statistical scores of Italy. Yet,
according to
WHO data, even infant mortality in the US is 0.63 % in the first year
of life
and 0.78 within the first five years (in Italy, the worst country in
the
Eurozone, it is 0.5 and 0.61 respectively; the best in the EU are the
Swedes,
with 0.32 and 0.4)[9].
The reasons for this result, unacceptable from
a European perspective, are
well known. A system based on individual bargaining between private
individuals
and insurance companies is ruled by the mechanism of “adverse
selection”. The
insurance company is most of all interested in acquiring as customers
only
those young and healthy individuals who are statistically less costly,
but for
this very reason also need health insurance cover less than others. In
the
event of unexpected accidents, these insured parties will often be
guaranteed
the most excellent standard of care (as often also happens to
foreigners who
stipulate a temporary health insurance policy with travel agencies when
travelling to the US) – provided contracts do not include
unconscionable
binding clauses. It is precisely those in greater need of health
insurance –
those suffering from chronic or recurrent illnesses or the elderly or
those at
risk – who are instead the customers private insurance
companies wish to do
without.
Hence not only the refusal or the
unsustainability of insurance costs for
individuals belonging to these categories – the refusal was
possible without
limitation until the Obama reform – but also the
inevitability of real
reciprocal swindles. On the one hand insurance companies entice people
into
signing standard form contracts filled with unconscionable clauses,
often
impossible to understand for those without expertise in this field and
bound to
leave the innocent customers with no cover for many serious and even
disabling
illnesses. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that this sort of
system
also encourages those wishing to take out a policy to act in an equally
dishonest manner. Generally speaking, customers tend to hide their
conditions
or lie on risk factors when they take out an insurance policy. Hence
the need
for a large number of preliminary medical tests before signing a
contract, many
of them often useless and possibly even potentially harmful to the
would-be
customer’s health, but necessary in the exclusive interest of
the insurance
companies. These tests are entirely paid for by customers and that has
resulted
in sky-high overall costs of health care in the US.
To these additional costs to the system,
useless for the protection of the
health of individuals, one must add the enormous cost of litigation due
to the
inclination of insurance companies, in the absence, or virtual absence
so far,
of effective public regulators, to pay for as few services as possible
At times
competition is frozen by means of cartel agreements that are obviously
difficult to uncover for both consumers and regulatory agencies, and
that
increases costs even more. Similar waste of money is caused by
the largely
useless or potentially harmful further clinical tests that are often
prescribed
for the sole purpose of preparing a legal defence in the event of
litigation
following possible fatal or undesired outcomes of medical or surgical
procedures.
Further huge costs result from the propaganda
and lobbying campaigns that
for decades have been used to induce the majority of Americans and
their
political representatives to preserve as it was, and partially still
is, such
an irrational, iniquitous and inefficient system. These costs too have
to be
covered by the customers of insurance companies. Seen from Europe, the
violent
reactions of many American citizens against any meaningful health care
reform
project in recent months, that are likely to cost the Democratic Party
dear,
could seem incomprehensible. But the cost of American health care is
also so
high because with their policies Americans are also paying for a huge
propaganda machine aimed at preserving the current system as much as
possible,
for the sole benefit of insurance companies. Lobbyists working in this
area are
among the best in the world, and are paid, and pay, a lot. But it is
quite
striking to watch good and active citizens so determined to defend the
indefensible against their own interests. This should suggest some
reflections
on the poor health of contemporary democracy and on the rationality of
the
making of public choice.
Since the Sixties, the American health care
system includes federal
programs benefiting the elderly and the poor (Medicare and Medicaid) as
well as
war veterans. Together, these public programs cover – before
the reform
implementation – about half of the total US health care
expenditure. This is no
surprise, given the tendency of the costs of all health care
systems to
concentrate always in a similar proportion to cover the needs of about
5 % of
the population most at risk because of age or condition. To this large
public
contribution to the total health care expenditure one should also add
the cost
of tax allowances granted for the payment of insurance policies. But
even this
remarkable share of public spending does not offset the disadvantages
described
above nor does it spare the American health care system its enormous
costs, so
much higher than the European ones, or its social iniquity. A telling
example
is that of young children of disadvantaged families with no health
insurance
that cannot be excused with the typical argument of extreme social
Darwinism,
according to which all individuals should always be considered
responsible for
their own lot, regardless of the different opportunities they were
offered. And
yet the immense economic and lobbying influence of insurance companies
over
American politics had even managed to prevent the extension of federal
insurance programs to disadvantaged minors until the Obama reform. An
attempt
by Congress to achieve this was in fact vetoed by former President
George Bush,
Jr.
The Obama reform has now largely expanded the
number of beneficiaries of
health care services and limited the arbitrary power of insurance
companies in
some key points, beginning with the prohibition on refusing to contract
with
customers who already suffer from pre-existing conditions and setting
fixed
ceilings of reimbursement thus limiting treatments for patients
suffering from
particularly costly diseases. The reform has imposed the inclusion of
university students, even when no longer minors, in family policies,
has
widened the social strata covered by the Medicaid program and extended
the
obligation to provide health insurance to employers with more than
fifty
employees. It has introduced an obligation to take out insurance,
albeit
limited to some, however wide, income brackets, for those not covered
by
employment contracts. It has introduced federal subsidies for small
businesses
willing to provide cover for their employees even when they are not
obliged to
do so and for lower income families.
In the end the Obama reform has indeed deeply
reformed the system, but
failed to reshape it at the root. And it is even less likely that the
reform,
when fully implemented, will lead to a containment of the total costs
of the
American health care system capable of bringing them down to Western
European
levels. Nor has it attempted to achieve a standardisation of the
evaluation
systems of the different policies offered on the market, which would
have
allowed consumers to make clearer and more informed choices. The most
controversial and most “Old Europe-style” proposal
was dropped: it aimed at
introducing a “public option”, i.e. a public
federal insurance scheme,
competing with the private ones, a move that was considered at the
beginning
the only appropriate instrument for pegging down policy prices in a
market
structured, firmly settled and layered such as that in the US today.
Last but not least, every system based on
individual bargaining between the
insured party and private insurance companies is bound to become
increasingly
unfair as a consequence of predictive medicine. If in the future
mapping the
individual genome provides an increasingly precise
individualisation of
risks, the very mutualistic character of the insurance principle will
disappear. Those at risk of developing expensive diseases, or maybe
incurable
ones, not only would be almost unable to obtain insurance to at least
alleviate
the consequences, but would also unnecessarily and inevitably be placed
in the
anxious condition of fearing for their unhappy fate years or decades in
advance, without being able to do anything at all to prevent those
events.
It should be remarked that within European
health care systems too, Italy
included, the public health service is only obliged to provide a basic
package
of health care (hence not stating the aforementioned non-acknowledged
creeping
cuts to due services) – levels that, as mentioned above, are
bound, rebus
sic stantibus, to suffer significant reductions in the
future. This fact
will inevitably lead to a rise in the number of those resorting to
taking out
supplementary private insurance, to be negotiated separately from the
basic
insurance package, for all that is not guaranteed by the public
service, but
not for this reason less necessary for guaranteeing tolerable life
conditions.
Consequently, in the near future these systems risk suffering the
disadvantages
typical of both systems. Without timely reforms, the cost of the
“adverse
selection” mechanism will increasingly be added to those
caused by patronage,
waste, corruption and the weight of politics and bureaucracy.
4) The future of European health
care: new prospects from the
Netherlands
While all European countries have been
attempting for years to preserve
universal health care cover mainly through added patches bound to prove
insufficient in the long term, the 2006 Dutch reform has been in our
opinion
the most intelligent and original reform experiment so far.
The Dutch reform[10],
that replaced a previous dual public and private system, did not
question the
European social model, and universal health care coverage, available
and
accessible to everyone, as its fundamental pillar. On the contrary, it
set the
conditions for such cover being guaranteed with greater certainty also
in the
future. It did so by abolishing at root-level all costs of
political
intermediation in the direct management of health care services, and
promoting
an almost total privatisation of the funding system. The strict
regulation laid down by the reform, far
from
compromising the correct functioning of a really competitive market,
allows on
the
contrary its effectiveness in a sector where relying on simple laissez
faire, for the aforementioned reasons, prevents its
functioning. In the
Netherlands the rules necessary for the development of effective
competition
have been set in a market by its nature incapable of producing them
spontaneously
and for what is probably the most effective system of containment of
costs and
accountability of all providers of services. In assessing the model and
in
order to take into consideration its profound differences from the
American
one, one must consider that the Netherlands are one of the European
countries
where social inequalities in accessing and taking advantage of health
care
services are relatively minor.
The reform provides for a compulsory and
universal insurance system for all
residents in the Netherlands, and also an obligation to contract
respecting
equal treatment and conditions on the part of companies offering health
care
insurance. As a consequence, all useless or harmful preliminary
clinical tests
and all those mainly aimed at evaluating the persisting profitability
of the
contractual relationship for insurers become pointless. All costs and
inequities typical of adverse selection are thus averted.
The contents of the basic benefit package are
set by law. Premium fees
comprise a fixed sum (sc. nominal part), which is the same for all
those
insured and paid directly to the insurer, and a sum proportional to
individual income
which is transferred to a risk equalisation fund collected and
redistributed by
the state to the insurance companies to compensate for financial
imbalances
deriving from the obligation to enter a contract with any applicant,
regardless
of one’s personal health conditions. This certainly implies
that the annulment
of the parasitical costs of political intermediation in the strictest
sense
achieved with the reform did not also entail an equally radical
reduction of
bureaucratic intermediation costs, but that is how the principle of the
universal mutualistic sharing of costs is safeguarded.
Minors are exempt from paying the premium (this
is the only part of the
funding of the health care system that is paid for exclusively through
general
taxation proper). Lower income individuals get subsidies for the
payment of the
premium proportional to income.
Insurance companies determine the nominal part
of the premium fee for the basic benefit package (that amount was on
average
1051 Euros in 2007 and raised to 1085/1200 in 2010). They can also
compete freely
in offering supplementary insurance policies, that are cheap enough to
be taken
out by over 90% of the population and may include dental care,
physiotherapy and
visual aids including those for adults, but also alternative medicine
and
plastic surgery. This latter point will deserve a closer examination
later,
given its theoretical and principle-related implications.
Insurance
companies can choose the final
providers of health care services
– and in this case, differently from political bodies,
choices will be made
exclusively on the basis of the quality-price ratio offered by
providers. However, they provide information on the service
quality but allow the insured to freely choose their doctors and
hospitals. The point, as
will be
examined later on, is crucial for the effective functioning of real
competition, not only among insurers but also among service providers.
The
insured can choose among different insurance products and have the
right
guaranteed by law to change insurance company every year at no
additional cost,
this being an instrument essential to ensure effective competition, a
control
of costs and real freedom of choice by customers. All customers,
regardless of
the kind and legal categorisation of their job or decisions made by
employers,
are entitled to the same opportunities of choice. They also have the
right to
be compensated for care received abroad within the expense limits
established
for the same services in the Netherlands.
The reform meant to ensure cost containment by
competition among insurance
companies, an instrument clearly more effective than internal controls
implemented by the same public authorities that also directly
manage
health care themselves in countries where ethical standards are
comparatively poor (in Italy, by the regional governments that
provide the
service, appoint the managers and personnel of public health care
providers and
conclude agreements with the private ones).
It is noteworthy that, in a system of this
kind, if consequently developed, funding universal
health care cover could have a reduced impact on public finances. This
is
crucial, above all in times of economic crisis and recurring
disturbances in
the financial markets, and especially for countries with high levels of
public
debt like Italy. Increases in health care costs –
inevitable, as
already said, over the coming decades – could not direcyly
result in huge
imbalances of
public accounts that would lead to a rise in the debt service, with the
well-known relevant systemic consequences of wealth redistribution to
the
benefit of financial revenue on government securities. Higher risks of
default
and consequent difficulties in the placement of public debt securities
are also
much less likely.
In
the Netherlands, after the passage of the
reform, a lot of discussions
focused on the very wide freedom of choice so far guaranteed to the
insured
with respect to final health care providers. This freedom of choice, it
is
argued, would have negative effects on the competition among providers,
as
competition among insurers currently focuses more on the cost of
premiums than
on the quality of health care, which might otherwise be the case if
companies
decided to contract selectively with health care providers. Initially,
as
mentioned, the choice of providers was made mostly by final users. But
they,
it is
argued, do not have the same expertise and knowledge of facts and
records, as
companies have, to ascertain quality and effectiveness of health care
provided,
due to information asymmetries, overwhelming for final users on the
health care
market. Afterwards, credibility and reliability of the information of
services quality has raised, and has steadily grown as the crucial
factor. Trust in the selection of services made by
insurers requires however a very high
degree
of confidence in them, a confidence that, in the hypothetical
case
of a
transplant of
the Dutch model to the Italian situation, would probably and
understandably be lower, at least initially. How difficult the
assessment of the quality of health care
is, was
however revealed by an estimation contained in a Dutch government
study,
according to which, still in the second year of enforcement of the
reform,
insurers
themselves were not yet able to make definitive comparative evaluations
on the
quality of health care supplied by different individual providers[11].
Anyway, in a system like the Dutch one,
economic interest is the tool for
ensuring economic efficiency and the overall soundness of the system,
rather
than the goodwill and the presumed foresight of the sole political
class and
bureaucracy. This tool implies more demanding productivity standards
than those
usually enforced by political management and is probably more effective
also in
curbing prescription drugs abuse (despite some pessimistic forecasts,
the Dutch
pharmaceutical spending is now equal to half that of the US). But it is
probably more efficient, above all, in ensuring the primary objective
of
achieving the sustainability of health care coverage for the entire
population,
which is, as mentioned at the beginning, everywhere at high risk for
very
objective reasons.
Neither should the strong economic interest
that pushes Dutch insurance
companies to invest significant resources in information campaigns and
to offer
their customers significant economic incentives aimed at promoting
lifestyles
and behaviours that favour effective prevention be underestimated.
The Dutch experience seems to suggest so far
that Europeans are culturally
less inclined than Americans to exceed in irrational and wasteful
health care
expenditure, since, as already said, competition among insurers,
fuelled by an
unexpected willingness of customers to exercise the power to change
company
upon annual expiry of policy at no additional cost, is mainly carried
out on
the grounds of the price to be paid. This behavioural pattern has also
been
fostered at the beginning by the provision for group negotiation (for
professional categories, consumer associations, groups of employees,
members of
sports clubs, etc.), which actually covers about 50 % of all contracts.
The
provision for group negotiation does strengthen the bargaining power of
the
insured, but is considered by some to be a feature of the health
insurance
market that could in the future prove an obstacle to the readiness,
that initially was quite strong, as
already
mentioned, to reassess annually the persisting
expediency of the
previously chosen option.
A legislator willing to take on the Dutch
reform model could obviously
provide for the possibility of copayments by the insured parties for
services
actually used, similar to that experienced in Italy with the system of
prescription charges (oddly called “tickets”
– in English – by the Italian
media), that proved quite effective even if low-priced, in order to
avoid
uncontrolled growth of costs fuelled by health care consumerism
stimulated by
market strategies or by “moral hazard” rather than
by effectiveness or
soundness of treatments and screenings. This risk, as is well known, is
one of
the main objections usually raised against any form of privatisation of
health
care services in Europe. And of course there would be nothing to
prevent a legislator
from possibly providing that contracted copayments be proportional to
income,
even if it is quite obvious that any such allowance would then have to
take
into consideration the possible iniquities due, especially in countries
like
Italy, to the state and performance of the entire public machine in
charge of
revenue monitoring.
In the event of the Dutch system being broadly
transplanted to other
countries other possible forms of copayment could be required of
insured
parties engaging in unhealthy behaviours and lifestyles (smoking,
alcohol,
psychotropic substances, pharmaceutical drugs, overeating, etc.),
obviously in
cases where these can be detected by medical tests. This might be the
case especially
if these behaviours persist even after the individual concerned has
already
taken advantage of medical treatments needed to deal with their
consequences. Further
treatments should not be made conditional on advance copayment, but it
should
be enjoined afterwards and possibly also be proportionate to the
harmfulness of
the behaviour concerned. From a liberal perspective it is not the job
of
society to defend its adult and sane members from themselves or from
harmful
lifestyles they have freely chosen – this
point deserves a closer examination
further on. This, however, should not mean that the contribution
required of
every taxpayer (or every insured individual) for the sake of universal
health
care coverage be pushed to the point of forcing them to settle the
economic
costs of others’ harmful or irresponsible behaviour.
In the Netherlands, the containment of
unnecessary treatments has been
pursued more schematically, first through a 255 Euro rebate for those
who in
the previous year did not take advantage of any treatment (other than
routine
medical tests, prevention services and those related to maternity and
childbirth). In 2005, for example, about a quarter of the insured were
granted
the rebate. From 2008 on, the containment has been pursued through the
provision of a mandatory annual deductible of 150 Euros (increased to
165 in
2010) from which the chronically ill are exempt. Voluntary deductibles
up to
500 Euro can be negotiated in exchange for reduced premium. It should
however
be again remarked that compulsory insurance only covers the legal basic
benefit
package, subject to continuous review and reassessment in order to
exclude (all
and only) frivolous, unnecessary and non-essential treatments.
The first four years under this new Dutch
system have proved the reform’s
promoters right. In fact from the very start, despite its profoundly
innovative
features, the reform has been appreciated by a large majority of the
Dutch,
although opinions are obviously not unanimous. The system has
maintained its
level of excellence in Europe, according to the results of the Euro
Health
Consumer Index 2009 drawn up by Health Consumer Powerhouse, a
leading
independent international research centre based in Stockholm (that
ranks Italy
15th in Europe)[12].
At
the same time it has so far proved able to slow down the cost increases
especially
compared to those occurring in the last five years of implementation of
the
previous system. Dutch health care spending is now 9.8 % of GDP, just
above the
Eurozone average (9.6), an area where national health care systems are
mostly
public. And no doubt the introduction of the new system has created a
general
and keen awareness, unparalleled in Europe, of the actual cost of
health care
and costs trends.
If it is still too early to assess the
long-term results of the Dutch
reform, two main factors will be very important in the future. On the
one hand
the effectiveness of monitoring competition among insurers and of
antitrust
regulations. From this point of view, concerns are raised over the
strong
competition on premiums in order to gain market share occurred in the
first
years of implementation of the new system. The consequent losses
incurred by
all insurers and the limited number of insurers operating in this field
on the
Dutch market after the concentration process that took place
– four of them currently
cover 89 % of the market – could trigger a forthcoming
significant increase in
premiums, once the number of competitors is further reduced. Perhaps it
might
also be advisable to prevent insurance companies from controlling or
being
associated with companies and institutions running hospitals or
directly
providing services, so as to ensure that control and containment of
expenditure
remain a priority interest for the insurance companies.
On the other hand effective monitoring of the
quality of services provided
is also essential. In the Netherlands this task is assigned to an
independent
authority (IGZ, Inspectie voor de
Gezondheidszorg)[13]
that has no political, propagandistic, electoral, reputational or
patronage
related reasons to defend or make programs or management choices made
by
insurers look smart, as is instead the case where it is the same
political
power that directly appoints, or exercises its influence over the
appointment
of, its own controllers. That is inevitably the case in the Italian
system and
entails a permanent source of obvious and inherent conflict of
interest.
Equally important is the circulation, reliability and availability of
information offered to the public on the actual results historically
obtained
by health care providers and on the actual scope of the cover provided
by insurance companies. Similarly, in a system that allows a
wide freedom
of choice and demands individual responsibility, health education has
even
greater importance, both in schools and in the media.
In the Netherlands the results achieved by
insurance companies are also
evaluated annually by a comparative quality index published on a
ministerial
website (KiesBeter.nl) that includes software that helps individuals to
identify the best deals on the market, matching their objective
condition and
subjective preferences.
What is essential is constant monitoring by
truly independent bodies. Independent,
that is, both of private
economic interests and of those of politicians and their more or less
hidden
stakeholders with their own electoral, patronage related and economic
agendas.
In addition circulation of information made available for public
evaluation and
discussion by the media, consumer organisations and users is also
essential. These
are the best instruments for avoiding the typical risks to every health
care system
based on private insurance. These include competition only on the price
of
premiums, on the length of waiting lists, staff courtesy and the
quality of
accommodation in hospitals or other merely whimsical and imaginary
needs. These
are things that can be evaluated by all users. What ordinary users are
generally not able to evaluate is the quality, effectiveness and
appropriateness of health care according to scientifically reliable
criteria –
at least for those who do not consciously want to reject them:
assuming,
however, in this case, as will be argued further on, full personal
responsibility.
In this area, the behaviour of other European consumers – at
least that of the
British, that has already been the object of specific studies
– seems much less
experienced so far than that of Americans.
For the moment no more than 1.5 % of Dutch
citizens have violated the obligation
to buy insurance, a violation punishable with a fine amounting to 130 %
of the cost
of the basic insurance package. Many of these people are part of the
extreme
fundamentalist Christian minority who believe that they should not
receive
treatment because diseases are God’s will. This is similar to
the percentage of
citizens that consistently refuse free and compulsory vaccinations.
As already mentioned, the current Dutch health
care system has only been in
force for four years. But its guidelines follow, in a more
accomplished
and consistent way, a pattern of private but closely regulated health
care
system already in place in Switzerland since 1996, its only fully
comparable
precedent[14].
The
two systems share a high degree of satisfaction among customers and a
high
level of quality of services supplied (Switzerland ranks 5th in Europe
according
to the aforementioned Euro Health Consumer Index 2009,
behind only the
Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland and Austria). Both also score among the
highest, compared
to other European countries, in achieving the lowest levels of social
inequality in the access to and use of health care services. It should
however
be acknowledged that the Swiss system is also quite expensive, costing
10.8 %
of GDP, a level exceeded only by France in the EU, and one point higher
than
the Dutch one, which in turn is not among the lowest. Since, as
mentioned, the
competition on premiums, unleashed in the first years of implementation
of the
reform in the Netherlands, had forced insurers to operate at a loss in
the first year of implementation of the new system, and
has
triggered a concentration process so far not averted by law or
regulators, the
question is raised whether it is just a matter of time before a similar
increase in costs occurs there too[15].
Four specific features of the Swiss system,
that make it different from the
Dutch one, could indeed be responsible for high costs. One is the lack
of
uniform legislation, as most of the implementation rules in Switzerland
are
enacted by individual cantons, making it less easy to distinguish the
economic
effects of the different regulations. Another is the mandatory domestic
and
non-profit character of health care insurers in Switzerland that could
perhaps
result in lower competitiveness and relatively inadequate management
efficiency. A third feature is the possibility of accessing specialist
care
without previous general practitioner prescription, provided in
Switzerland by
many contractual schemes (no gate-keeping function of GPs, as usual in
the US),
a possibility excluded instead in the Netherlands (as is mostly the
case
throughout Europe). Finally, and most importantly, high Swiss costs
might also
be the consequence of a much less sophisticated regulation of risk
adjustment
factors for the allocation of the risk equalisation fund (the fund
resulting
from solidarity contributions required of policyholders and
redistributed by
the state among insurers). In Switzerland, like in the Netherlands,
insurers
are not allowed to refuse a contract based upon the individual health
risk
profile of buyers. However the factors for risk equalisation are not
only
calculated differently in individual cantons, but, at least until 2011,
only
relate to age and sex (after 2011 hospital admissions in the previous
year will
also be taken into account), whereas in the Netherlands parameters are
much
more well structured and detailed upon the health profile of the
insured party.
Consequently many Swiss insurance companies chose, or were forced, to
leave the
health care sector, or introduced strict selective contracting in the
offer of
supplementary policies. This is a trend that certainly triggered, for
the reasons
argued in the discussion of the American system, a general cost
increase in
Switzerland, but that phenomenon is quite limited in the Netherlands,
at least
for the time being.
It is therefore prudent to postpone a
definitive judgement on the measure of
the aptitude of the new Dutch system to achieve an effective
containment of the
growth of costs of a health care system available to all citizens. So
far,
however, the reform seems to have proved it is possible to avoid both
waste and
the risk of misappropriation and abuse that characterise the
Italian-style
party-political management of health care, along with the diseconomies
and
iniquities that characterise the total deregulation of the American
system.
5) Freedom of choice in health care:
significance and implications
As already mentioned, in the Dutch model
companies can compete to gain
market share also by offering supplementary insurance and that can also
include
non-essential treatments or treatments that are the subject of
recurrent
philosophical or moral controversies, such as cosmetic surgery and
alternative
medicine. The point is interesting as it stimulates a discussion on the
scope
that should be recognised to individual “freedom of
choice” in health care
in a free and pluralistic society: the formula is usually merely
related to the
choice of service providers.
Defining what is a medical treatment that is
socially necessary to
guarantee to every individual, and distinguishing it from what is not,
entails
a discussion in which effectiveness of treatment, equity and social
solidarity
issues are overlapped by others. These concern different personal views
of the
world and different lifestyles. In open and increasingly plural
societies, even
medical treatments can be, and as a rule increasingly are and will be,
the
subject of very different evaluations.
First, what is to be considered essential to
guarantee everyone a decent
life can no longer be taken for granted or merely determinable on the
basis of
technical and “objective” criteria. This is a good
reason for limiting
treatments guaranteed on solidarity bases solely to those proved
necessary and
effective according to the evaluation of the international scientific
community
and the need for which is almost unanimously shared by society. This
limitation
not only enables us to concentrate all the available funds raised
through taxes
(or through the contribution required of all the insured in the Dutch
and Swiss
systems), that are by definition scarce, on the full satisfaction of
those
needs, thus ensuring their sustainability over time. It also allows the
leaving
out of compulsory contribution those charges that a more or less
sizeable part
of society may regard as non-essential, at least if compared to others,
or even
inappropriate, but that can equally be considered by others as
absolutely
essential for an acceptable quality of life. On the other hand, in a
strictly
regulated insurance market such as that implemented with the Dutch
reform, even
non-essential treatments that would otherwise be out of reach for many
could
become relatively affordable. It is in fact also through the offer of
supplementary insurance that companies can compete for market share and
thus
entice customers into buying their basic package.
Enforcing a strict distinction between
essential and non-essential care
also means preserving the health care funds forcibly taken
from all
beneficiaries from the abuse that the widespread rise of political
populism and
anti-scientific irrationalism will otherwise make
“democratically” inevitable.
Just consider for example the field of
“alternative” medicine, the trust placed
in this by both Western Third-Worldists distrustful of technological
medicine,
and by many immigrants (such as many Chinese), now a consolidated and
stable
part of the European population, increasingly European citizens
themselves. Or
think of treatments deemed ineffective by the scientific community, but
the
subject of extraordinary investment of trust by very large sectors of
public
opinion, who place in them quasi-religious hopes.
Years ago in Italy an unprecedented squandering
of public health care
resources took place, in order to finance a large-scale clinical trial
of a
treatment, the “Di Bella treatment”, considered
ineffective by the scientific
community and therefore completely useless and reckless. The mass
clinical
trial was imposed on the government by massive public demonstrations,
supported
and instigated by irresponsible political and media charlatans. Their
pressure
was impossible to resist by those in charge of the public health care
system,
as the instigators cynically played on the desperation of patients
suffering
deadly disease, and their relatives. The funds necessary for that
useless trial
were obviously taken away from treatments of proven effectiveness in
the same
field, that of cancer care, or in other branches of medicine. Despite
the
damage caused to public finance and to taxpayers by this irresponsible
initiative, the instigating politicians who had organised that campaign
not
only were never held accountable in any way, not even politically.
Instead they
were allowed to gain profit in terms of visibility, popularity,
electoral
approval and political power, in that particular case, managing to win
the
regional government of Lazio and its health care machine, causing, not
surprisingly, its complete financial breakdown.
In a free society, citizens have a right to be
superstitious, as there is
no objective criterion, that is not arbitrarily discriminatory, to
distinguish
superstition from the increasingly diversified beliefs definable as
religious.
Nor are there possible objective dividing lines between what is and
what is not
“religious”. The job of public authorities, in a
free society, does not include
defending from themselves adult and sane citizens who want to harm
themselves –
or do what Western-minded people like this author, the better informed,
the
majority (perhaps, and for the time being) of public opinion, the
scientific
community or the still reasoning sectors of the political establishment
consider to be self-injury. But, increasingly, maintaining the
political
monopoly over the management and direction of health care will
inevitably make
it compulsory to “democratically” take into account
a variety of insights on
the world that now irreversibly include those scornful of
“scientism” and who
equate scientific knowledge and superstition, technological medicine
and
“traditional” medicine. New “Di Bella
cases” will certainly arise in the future
and, again, even the most upright politicians will be forced to bow, if
they
want to survive politically, to the uncontainable pressure of political
and
media charlatanry. Separating the fields also permits the limiting of
claims
for solidarity contribution to health care funding to those necessary
for the
provision of really essential treatments, of proven effectiveness and
on which
there is general consensus in the scientific community, without causing
resentment or otherwise unavoidable collective psychosis, and without
discriminating against the hopes, beliefs, religions and superstitions
of the
supporters of the new rising primitivism and irrationalism.
Nothing should prevent those so wishing from
purchasing on the market and
at their own expense all the other “alternative”
treatments they think they cannot
do without. They should be able to do so, if they wish, by entering
into
private contracts supplementary to the mandatory health care insurance,
perhaps
provided that the concerned treatments though maybe utterly useless,
are not
proven harmful, and provided they are not fraudulently advertised as
having
proven therapeutic effectiveness and risks are not hidden.
What really matters in health care expense
containment is that everybody
has timely access to treatments considered effective by the
international
scientific community. Every possible expense for further non-essential,
ineffective or redundant treatments that individuals want to make for
their
health, their wellbeing, their contentment, their gratification, their
serenity, their beliefs, should not engender any detriment to the funds
allocated for essential treatments and universal health care coverage,
and
collected through compulsory contribution, imposed, one way or another,
on
everybody on the ground of solidarity, in order to achieve that primary
goal. What
matters is that further possible expenses do not put at jeopardy the
feasibility and sustainability of the primary objective of guaranteeing
everyone all those treatments to which they should be entitled. Once
that goal
is ensured, once the two fields and their funding sources are clearly
separated, it should be held politically and economically irrelevant
that
single individuals decide to spend their own money on cosmetic surgery,
alternative medicine, spas, wellness, pilgrimages to Lourdes or
propitiatory
rites. It should be as irrelevant as spending the same money in
clothing, cars,
popular exclusive intelligent or demential holidays, or whatever other
consumer
goods – including even lethal legal drugs such as tobacco and
spirits, so long
as the consequences of their use is not paid for by others.
The irresistible urge of a political class
accustomed to playing the master
(also) in the domain of health care, to superimpose their own whims
above the
assessments of the international scientific community, recently came to
the
fore once again. This time it was in the controversies against putting
the
RU-486 abortion pill on the Italian market, and the method of its
administration which part of the political establishment would not only
like to
make this more difficult and painful. They would also like to make it
unnecessarily expensive (again
at the
expense of other health care needs being satisfied and other items of
health
care expenditure), by imposing with a political decision a mandatory
hospitalisation
that is not provided for by international medical protocols. A similar
political meddling in medical proceedings was evidenced in the
rebellion of
some politicians against the abolition of prescription for post-coital
contraception
(“morning-after pill”). This has been a
well-established practice for decades
in Western Europe and beyond. In these cases the politicians involved
were not
supported by, nor were they able to stir up, any mass populist
campaigns, but
operated as a political wing of a powerful religious pressure group
representing
a clear minority in Italian society. Even in these controversies,
however,
politicians with no scientific or professional qualifications were
ready to
interfere, solely on behalf of their “democratic”
legitimacy and
representativeness, and not only with ideological or religious
arguments, but
also with allegedly “scientific” ones.
Even if it were possible to exclude such
bizarre interference by a
primitive national political establishment – perhaps just the
forefront of a
continental regressive trend, as has previously been the case in
Italian
history – the way back to a trusting reliance of
“patient” citizens upon
decisions taken paternalistically by “those who know
more” would in any case be
unworkable. This is not just because it would suppose that a general
reliability and intellectual integrity of all operators might be taken
for
granted, starting with top political decision makers themselves (it
would be
naive in the first place to assume what all users should be convinced
of). It
would also be unworkable because two prerequisites have long
disappeared: the
indisputable supremacy of scientific knowledge and the univocality of
ethical
choices. Contemporary culture has, rightly or wrongly, irreversibly
called into
question, the epistemological foundation of the first assumption and
irrevocably asserted the irreducibility and the full legitimacy of
diverse
ethical choices. This is also why all the recurrent recriminations
against
“do-it-yourself medicine” are bound to remain
hopelessly ineffective. It is
simply impossible to expect to solve problems through a simple
reference to the
principle of authority – if it were only the authority of a
hypothetical pure
science, capable, though it is not known how, of being detached from
any compromise
with industrial or political interests and from economic constraints.
Rather,
it would be useful, necessary and appropriate to engage doctors,
researchers
and journalists in health education, starting at school level.
Incidentally, although the argument obviously
deserves much more than a
passing reference, leaving greater room for individual
self-determination and
freedom of choice in health care, and releasing health care from the
unlimited
discretion of political rule does not necessarily imply running the
risk of
expenditure increases or unleashing the most irresponsible health
consumerism
(at taxpayers’ expense in a system almost entirely public,
or, according to the
approach hereby proposed, at their own expense). In some cases, indeed
there
may even be opposite effects.
This is particularly clear when, as
unfortunately happens in Italy,
sophisticated and very expensive medical treatments can be, and in fact
are,
imposed against the will of people unable to properly and validly
express their
consent at the very time when such treatments are carried out on their
bodies
but who had expressly refused their consent to such treatments in a
living will
drawn up when they were in full possession of their mental faculties.
In a pluralistic
society aggressive and futile care cannot be determined by political or
supposedly “technical” standardized decisions that
can be imposed on all by
politicians. That would be nothing but an abuse and an act of violence
on the
part of politicians against the dignity and freedom of individuals.
Political
parties and parliamentary majorities will never realistically enforce
such
abuse on grounds of the ethical and philosophical assessments usually
put
forward, noble, albeit controversial, though they may be. Instead, as
indeed
has happened in Italy in recent years, it will be enforced only on the
grounds
of political, patronage related and electoral convenience, with a view
to creating
parliamentary and social alliances, gaining the support of pressure
groups and
organised active minorities, and so on. Only in very rare cases,
through the
work and authoritarian beliefs of a few minor politicians revealed to
the more
naive and traditionalist electorate as a decoy, will it have anything
to do with
their subjective good faith. Even in that event, however, it will be a
case of
political hybris, ideological arrogance, overbearing expressions of
religious
pride imposed as a compulsory lifestyle even on those opposed to them
in their
lifetime – or rather, imposed on others’ bodies
against the express will of
those individuals, by people long aware of no longer being able to
convince their
consciences.
In a pluralistic society it should be
acknowledged that politics should
have only the power to produce, with great care, a default solution, to
be
enforced in the absence of express individual decisions. Only the
individual,
however, can decide below which level of quality of life his/her
continuing to
live is not only no longer beneficial, but for him/her
becomes a mere burden.
A burden that usually not only entails unacceptable physical or
psychological
suffering and forced submission to a violent loss of individual dignity
on the
part of the individual
personally
concerned. It also means a huge economic waste of valuable health care
resources, at the expense of the availability and timeliness of other
treatments for the benefit of others. Rarely in these discussions, in
fact, is
this side of the issue even considered. Very often the intensive
treatments
needed to keep alive individuals whose will concerning the end of their
life is
ignored, are also extremely costly. In such cases, respecting
individual
self-determination would not only avoid offending the personal dignity
of those
concerned, but could also turn into a very tangible benefit for the
health of
others: a virtuous social, and even indirectly or unintentionally
“altruistic”
consequence of the respect for individual self-determination.
In any event, and whatever one’s
opinion on social issues (i.e. those
referred to in Italy as “controversial ethical
issues”), the question of
freedom of choice in health care goes well beyond the choice of doctors
and
hospitals. The flag in the struggle for “freedom of
choice” in health care was
initially raised in other countries on that very ground, but in Italy
this
problem is less acute than in countries where national health care
services
unlike in our case, allow users (or until recently allowed them) little
or no
personal choice in the matter, not even regarding their preferred
medical
doctors. The problem of freedom of choice concerns individual
self-determination in a much broader sense, involving the pluralism of
values
inherent to contemporary Western societies.
It is perhaps no coincidence that some of the
most ardent and knowledgeable
Italian advocates of an entirely public and politically managed health
care
system, based their reflections on health care policies, and well
beyond the
complex technicalities of their specific subject, came to a passionate
defence
of communitarianism, understood as an overall principle of social
organisation
opposed to what they call “individualism”.
Elsewhere I have tried to contribute
to the elucidation of the different linguistic uses of this term in
different
national historical contexts and consequent misunderstandings. Here it
is worth
simply recalling the sinister meaning, resounding for a century in
sociological
reflections, of the idea of compulsory belonging to a
“community” (Gemeinschaft), as opposed to the voluntary membership of a
social organisation (Gesellschaft) based upon agreed and shared rules. It is
also worthwhile objecting that,
in plural societies like ours, expecting that a forced and
all-absorbing
communitarian cohesion might be artificially recreated can only produce
social
disintegration and, eventually, a segmentation of society into micro
communities along ethnic, regional, cultural, generational or religious
lines. Sometimes,
it is only these,
regrettably, that can, by fair means or foul, impose on themselves the
social
uniformity that it is no longer possible to enforce on society as a
whole. The
result is a number of opposing micro communities, in a struggle for
hegemony or
at least for a division of public resources, precariously co-existing
until they
feel able to overpower each other.
Perhaps the defence of communitarianism put
forward by health care
economics specialists might not fully take account of all the possible
and
sinister implications of such an approach. Or it might be an expedient
not to
have to acknowledge that it is actually the political class that again
has the
last word in every publicly ruled health care system, they being the
ones, on
the end, entitled to express the binding will of the
“community”. In the
current cultural climate, in Italy as well as elsewhere,
“community”, to many,
could perhaps seem a less compromised and more acceptable word than
“political
class” or “parties”, or sound –
what it is not – gentler, more inoffensive and
amiable. But claiming that it should be the task of «the
community to define
what health is»[16]
–
“health”, note, not just “health
care” – is a very demanding application indeed
of a quite radical brand of communitarianism that may sound threatening
to
critical and free spirits.
Increasingly, across Europe, communitarianism
is the political theory
opposed not only to the brand of individualism interpreted as a barely
diluted
form of social selfishness (rather than, as would be historically more
correct,
as the attempt to defend the individual and his/her critical autonomy
from
uniformity and standardisation), but to the liberal and democratic idea
that
the foundations of a free society should be the respect for individual
liberty,
for the rule of law and the voluntary consent of citizens to
the constitutional
covenant, rather than a forced homogeneity of values imposed on society
by
binding political orders. Consent to the constitutional covenant is
itself the
expression of a choice of values, significant if minimal, that
according to
democratic liberalism should be generally shared. However
communitarians demand
much more. Homogeneity is often required as a product of universal
faithfulness, that, it is claimed, must be natural and spontaneous, to
the
“roots” and ancestral values held to be the only
possible foundation of genuine
and cohesive social bonds. Such roots are nowadays, and in some cases
have for
centuries been alien to the personal cultural and family heritage of
many
members of our societies. To opponents who resist social compulsory
homogeneity,
who do not find it spontaneous and natural at all to adapt, it seems
communitarians demand that they bow to the lifestyles and values
imposed on
society by political majorities. (Perhaps it is not entirely a
coincidence that
the country that found what is in our view such a virtuous balance
between the
demands for equity and social solidarity and individual
self-determination in
its health care system is also one of the few to have also regulated
for active
voluntary euthanasia).
To return in conclusion to the more limited
scope of the reform of health
care policies, the crucial point of this reflection is that it is not a
matter
of making private management of health care the object of the same
uncritical
trust that has mostly disappeared, and for well-founded reasons, in
political
management. It is a matter of taking the distinctive character of
health care
economics seriously. It is worthwhile, therefore evaluating the
possibility of
extending to other countries a system, already successfully tested to
some
extent, and no less universalistic than those currently enforced
elsewhere in
Europe. This is a system in which both buyers and providers of health
care
services are encouraged to pursue an independent economic self-interest
to
contain health care costs, while at the same time being forced to
compete in
quality and effectiveness of treatments and customer satisfaction. It
is a
system in which the political establishment and the civil service
continue to
act as regulators and controllers, but no longer directly manage health
care
(let alone act as citizens’ spiritual directors). They are
therefore, as far as
possible, prevented from the possibility of making illegal economic or
electoral profits out of insoluble conflicts of interest – so
that the only
hope for improving the ethical quality and fairness of their behaviour
is not
placed in their miraculous collective repentance and conversion. It is
a system
in which the increase in health care costs, to some extent inevitable
in the
coming decades as a result of demographic change and technological
advances,
cannot put an additional burden on public finance causing further
imbalances,
bound eventually to lead to a redistribution of wealth to the benefit
of
recipients of financial income on government securities, thus largely
frustrating, if not reversing, the actual equitable or redistributive
intent of
all welfare policies.
From the liberal point of view of the author of
these lines, the Dutch
reform has also the not unimportant merit of once again recalling
that the
free market is not purely a synonym for laissez faire,
and that
unlimited laissez faire is no synonym for
liberalism.
We should be realistic enough not to
be under any illusions. In Italy
we would have to be on the brink of a final and irreparable financial
collapse
of the entire system before we could persuade politicians and vested
interests
pressure groups to give up. Nonetheless the task of this article is to
put up
for discussion, perhaps even for a future debate, solutions that
politicians –
and above all politicians, on average of the lowest level in Europe
such as the
Italians, mostly demagogues and outlaws or inept followers of opinion
polls,
rather than responsible leaders – do not have the strength or
the will to
address until inescapably obliged by the coercive force of events[17].
In this case these will be the decreasing sustainability of the current
health
care system’s costs over time and the political impossibility
of continuing to
conceal beyond a certain limit the inevitable reduction of the
effective
availability of health care services.
[1]
An overall rather sympathetic and comparative
description
of the Italian health care system
in Nerina Dirindin, Paolo Vineis, Elementi di
economia sanitaria, Bologna,
Il Mulino, 1999. A fundamental defence of the
existing system in Rosy
Bindi, La
salute impaziente. Un bene pubblico e un diritto di ciascuno,
Milano, Jaca
Book, 2004 (the author is a former health minister). A more
critical approach in Erminio
D’Annunzio, Sanità malata,
Roma, Castelvecchi, 2010 (the author is a former member, responsible for
health care, of the
regional government of
Abruzzo). Franca Maino, La politica
sanitaria, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001. A historical perspective
in Saverio Luzzi, Salute e sanità
nell’Italia repubblicana, Roma, Donzelli, 2004.
[2]
Fabio Pammolli, La sanità in
Italia: sostenibilità dei conti
pubblici e nuovi assetti istituzionali, in Le
riforme che mancano. Trentaquattro proposte per il welfare del
futuro, edited by Carlo Dell’Aringa e Tiziano Treu,
Arel, Bologna, Il
Mulino, 2009.
[3]
Nerina Dirindin,
Paolo Vineis, 1999, p.87.
[4]
F. Pammolli , G.
Papa, N. C. Salerno, La spesa sanitaria
pubblica in Italia: dentro la “scatola nera” delle
differenze regionali. Il Modello Saniregio, Cerm, Quaderno 2/2009.
[5]
Paolo Cornaglia-Ferraris,
Eugenio Picano, Malati di spreco. Il
paradosso della sanità italiana, Roma-Bari,
Laterza, 2004. Rapporto sullo Stato sociale
2006. Welfare
state e crescita economica, edited by Roberto Pizzuti,
Novara, De Agostini
Utet 2006, p 214 fol.
[6]
Ivan Cavicchi, La privatizzazione silenziosa
della sanità.
Cronache sul razionamento del diritto alla salute, Datanews,
Roma, 2003.
Id., Il pensiero debole della
sanità,
Bari, Dedalo, 2008.
[7]
Mark Pearson, Head, Health Division OECD, Disparities in health expenditure across
OECD countries: Why does the United States spend so much more than
other
countries?, Written Statement to Senate Special Committee on
Aging, 30th
September 2009, OECD, 2009. Gavino Maciocco, La spesa sanitaria americana, saluteinternazionale.info,
30/11/2009.
[8]
The overwhelming influence of social factors in
public
health results is highlighted in Public
Health, Ethics and Equity, ed. by Sudhir Anand, Fabienne
Peter and Amartya
Sen, Oxford University Press, 2004.
[9] http://www.who.int/whosis/indicators/en/
[10]
A synthesis on the Dutch system, compared to
the
British one in Claire Daley and James Gubb, Health
reform in the Netherlands, CIVITAS Institute for the Study of
Civil
Society, 11/2007. A discussion on the Dutch reform compared to the
American
system in Maggie Mahar and Niko
Karvounis, Going Dutch for health reform
ideas, The Health Care Blog, 22/6/2008. Marco Romanelli, Sistema
sanitario
olandese,
saluteinternazionale.info, 3/3/2010.
[11]
Rudy Douven,
Marco Ligthart, Esther Mot, Marc Pomp, Early experiences with the Dutch health care
reform,
EUROFRAME-EFN Autumn
2007 Report, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
[12]
Arne Björnberg,
Ph.D., Beatriz Cebolla Garrofé, Ph.D. and Sonja Lindblad, Euro Health Consumer
Index 2009
Report, Health
Consumer
Powerhouse, Stokholm 2009.
[13]
The Health Care Inspectorate in short,
http://www.igz.nl/english/
[14]
Robert E. Leu, Frans F. H. Rutten, Werner
Brouwer,
Pius Matter, and Christian Rütschi,
The Swiss and Dutch Health Insurance
Systems: Universal Coverage and Regulated Competitive Insurance Markets,
The Commonwealth Found, January 2009. This report was
jointly produced
by two country teams at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Health,
Welfare
and Sports, the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health, and the Swiss
Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs.
[15]
A discussion of the implications of the global
crisis
for the Dutch health care system in Hans Maarse, Cost
Control in the Netherlands: Testing Market Practices, in Cost
Control and Health Care Reform: Act 1, Commentary
from the Health Care Cost Monitor blog, May–September 2009,
The
Hastings Center, 2009.
[16]
Paolo Vineis, Nerina
Dirindin, In Buona salute. Dieci
argomenti per difendere la sanità pubblica,
Torino, Einaudi, 2004, p.76.
[17]
The Dutch reform was first presented to the
attention
of the Italian public in November
2008, at the international
conference “Per una politica sanitaria europea / Health Care
Policy and
Fundamental Rights in Europe”, organised in Rome by the
European Liberal Forum
with the support of the Critica liberale foundation. The proceedings
have been
edited in English by Beatrice Rangoni Machiavelli and Francesco Velo,
Brussels,
European Liberal Forum, 2009. See also
Giampaolo
Galli, Ci può essere un futuro per un sistema
sanitario universale e
responsabile, in Le riforme che mancano,
cit., p. 245.
.